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Abstract
Financial constraints or economic needs, career development, psychological satisfaction
as well as demographic and situational factors cause workers to seek more than one job
while enjoying leisure time. In this paper we examine how a worker with prospect theory
type of preferences allocates her time between leisure, a safe job and a risky job. Optimal
time allocation for a sufficient loss averse worker depends on the reference level which in
turn determines whether the worker is willing to experience relative losses or not. When
the reference level is relatively low then the sufficiently loss averse worker will allocate
some of her time to leisure and will hold both jobs in order to diversify risk and reduce
income loss arising from the risky job. However, if the probability of a good state of nature
is very high and the reference level is very low, the worker spends time only on leisure
and the risky job while avoids the safe job. Loss aversion does not affect the optimal time
allocation to the three activities as the time allocation results in avoiding relative losses for
any state of nature. When the reference level is relative high, but not too high, the worker
will allocate her time between both safe and risky jobs as well as to the leisure. Worker
with very high reference level will avoid the safe job and will divide her time between the
risky job and the leisure. In both cases the worker is willing to accept relative losses in
the bad state of nature provided it is compensated with relative gains in the good state
of nature. Here the allocation of time to the three activities depends on the degree of loss
aversion. When the reference level is relatively low, but not too low, an increase in the
reference level will reduce leisure time, reduce time in the risky job and increase time in
the safe job. At very low reference levels, an increase in the reference level will result in
the worker re-allocating her time from leisure to the risky job assuming the probability
of a good state of nature is higher than a threshold. When the reference level is high the
opposite effects are observed. We also examine other comparative statics including the
effect of changes in the wage rate.
Keywords: multiple job holdings, prospect theory, loss aversion
JEL classification: D81, G11, E24
1 Introduction
In many instances a worker will undertake more than one job due to financial constraints or
needs, career development, psychological satisfaction as well as demographic and situational
factors (Campion et al., 2020). Without discounting any of the above listed motivations,
the important reason for multiple job-holding is financial constraints and economic needs.1
Workers often face a constraint on the number of hours available for them to work in their
primary job limiting their earnings capacity (Shishko and Rostker, 1976; Dickey et al., 2015;
Hirsch et al., 2016b). This underemployment causes the individual to seek for another job
in order to achieve the desired income goal. Income supplement from a second job due to
earning constraints in the primary occupation is also a motivating factor (Hirsch et al., 2016a;
Klinger and Weber, 2020). Other motivations include unstable earnings in the primary job
(e.g., artists, independent consultants, entrepreneurs) which cause people to diversify risk
associated with income fluctuations by working also in more stable occupations such as an
eight hour per day job (Throsby and Zednik, 2011; Guariglia and Kim, 2004; Hlouskova
et al., 2017; Menger, 2017). Teachers and university professors who have a desired income
goal higher than the salary often undertake a second job (Guthrie, 1969; Raffel and Groff,
1990; Parham and Gordon, 2011; Timothy and Nkwama, 2017). Some workers will moonlight
because they enjoy the work reducing their leisure time (Averett, 2001; Amuedo-Dorantes and
Kimmel, 2009). Some individuals undertake additional activities in the underground economy
working in a second job under the table and evade having to pay payroll taxes (Brunet, 2008).
A second job might be taken for career development whereby the individual derives different
utilities from the desire for diversity in the job’s tasks (Fraser and Gold, 2001; Renna and
Oaxaca, 2006; Casacuberta and Gandelman, 2012; Hirsch et al., 2016a, 2016b) or a second
job could aid the worker in transition to a new career (Arora, 2013; Russo et al., 2018).
In addition, a second job may be undertaken for personal satisfaction, passion, aspiration,
enjoyment or for a new enrichment and experience (Averett, 2001; Osborne and Warren, 2006;
Wrzesniewski et al. 2013; Caza et al., 2018).
In this research we explore the role the loss aversion and reference dependent behavior
play in deciding to take on multiple job-holdings. To this end, prospect theory will be used to
explain the desire of workers to hold one or two jobs, one being the job with the safe income
and the second one is considered to yield risky income (e.g., an entrepreneur) providing new
insights that have not been previously explored when also leisure time is considered.2 An
1Furthermore Campion et al. (2020) found that at least 5 percent of the working population in the US
have multiple jobs and this can be as high as 35 percent. A study by Conen (2020) found similar participation
rates in multiple job holdings for Europe. The trend is expected to increase in the future.
2Economists attempt to study human behavior under risk using the expected utility theory (EUT) model
developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) as a rational choice theory with stable and consistent
preferences derived from well founded basic axioms. However, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found in exper-
imental laboratories that human behavior under risk violates the axioms and predictions of the EUT theory.
Kahneman and Tversky also developed a theoretical model of preferences, namely prospect theory, which is
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example would be a hybrid entrepreneur (Campion et al., 2020) who is starting a new risky
business but also works in a safe occupation with a known wage (Raffiee and Feng, 2014;
Thorgren et al., 2016; Schulz et al., 2017).
There is some evidence that workers use prospect theory type of preferences. For example,
prospect theory has been used to explore labor supply decisions of New York City cab driver
(Camerer et al., 1997). Camerer et al. (1997) find evidence that New York cab drivers
work more (less) hours on a given day when the average hourly wage rate is low (high) on
that day making this consistent with the predictions of prospect theory. Crawford and Meng
(2011), based on the Koszegi and Rabin (2006) reference dependent model, found that drivers
use hours and sometimes income targets as reference points. Farber (2005, 2008) also finds
support that workers use prospect theory type of preferences.
As discussed in the introductory paragraph, a worker could be searching for a second job
because her current earnings fall short relative to a target level. The target level is nothing
else than a reference level and hence prospect theory analysis seems to be applicable. Workers
could be loss averse as well. Loss aversion within the context of labour supply implies that
workers are more sensitive when they experience a loss of income than when faced with an
equal income gain. Loss of income can be caused by either hour constraints, wage reduction or
a bad state of nature occurring (such as global pandemic of coronavirus disease, COVID-19).
According to prospect theory this loss of income results in more pain than the happiness from
a gain of equal magnitude. Furthermore, workers could be displaying risk aversion in the
domain of gains but become risk lovers when confronted with losses (diminishing sensitivity).
Thus, losses could trigger workers to search for a second risky job which yields an uncertain
income.
In this paper we extend the model in Hlouskova et al. (2017) that is based on a behavioral
portfolio approach. They present an explanation for workers, with prospect type of prefer-
ences, to hold two jobs, one with safe income and the other with an uncertain income, while
holding leisure time constant. In classical economic theory, the issue of incentive to work has
often been analyzed as a choice between working and leisure time. Introducing leisure into the
model is an obvious enrichment. Workers make their choices simultaneously by considering
both the multiple holdings of jobs as well as the time they allocate towards leisure. In this
research, we intend to explore the implications of this more general model.
Thus, in this paper, the model is extended to include leisure decisions. The worker now
decides on how to allocate her time endowment between leisure, a safe job that pays with
certainty a given wage rate and a risky job which pays an uncertain wage. For simplicity we
assume two states of nature. A good state of nature where the worker can earn in the risky
job a wage rate greater than that of the safe job and a bad state of nature where the wage
built on its own axioms and captures the evidence found in such laboratories such as reference dependent
behaviour, aversion against losses, diminishing sensitivity (risk aversion in domain of gains and risk seeking in
domain of losses). See also Barberis (2013).
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rate is below the one she earns in the safe job. The wage rate in the bad state of nature is
assumed to be nonzero and could be bounded by minimum wage laws. Two following cases
arise. First, when worker’s actual income in either state of nature exceeds her reference level.
Namely, the worker prefers not to have relative losses in any state of nature which can be
achieved by having a low reference level for income. Second, when worker’s actual income in
the good state of nature exceeds the reference level, resulting in relative gains, but the actual
income in the bad state of nature is less than the reference level and thus resulting in relative
losses. The second case occurs for those workers that have a high income reference level (i.e.,
high income aspiration) and thus are willing to take more risk and accept relative losses in
the bad state of nature for having relative gains in the good state of nature.3
When the reference level is relatively low (but not very low) an increase in the reference
level (aspiration) will reduce the time allocated to the risky job as well as the leisure, which
is thus offset by an increase in the time allocated to the safe job. In Hlouskova et al. (2017)
time allocated to the risky job also fell with an increase in the reference level but leisure
was not allowed to adjust forcing only an increase in time allocated to the safe job. In this
extension we also find that for very low reference levels, when assuming the probability of the
good state of nature being sufficiently high and thus the risky job becomes more attractive,
the worker will avoid the safe job totally and allocate time between the risky job and leisure.
In this case, an increase in the reference level will increase time allocated to the risky job
taking away time from leisure. In the absence of leisure choice, this effect was not present in
Hlouskova et al. (2017). For the optimal solution to evolve the worker has to be sufficiently
loss averse but because the household remains in the domain of relative gains in both states
of nature loss aversion does not affect the time allocation to the three activities. Any increase
in any of the wage rates, say due to a lower payroll tax, will result in the worker being happier
since expected utility increases. In the first case where all three activities are selected, an
increase in the wage rate in the good or bad state of nature will increase time allocated to
the risky job and decrease time allocated to both leisure and to the safe job. The effect of an
increase in the wage rate in the safe job to the three activities is in general ambiguous due
to the conflicting income and substitution effects. There would be, for instance, an increase
in time allocated to the safe job and a reduction in the time allocated to the risky job and
leisure if the probability of good state of nature to occur and the reference level for income
are sufficiently low.
When the reference level is relatively high (but not too high) then the worker achieves a
relative gain in the good state of nature and is willing to suffer a relative loss in the bad state
of nature. In this case, an increase in the reference level yields opposite results to the previous
case where the reference level was relatively low, except for the expected utility function which
in all cases under consideration decreases with increasing reference level (depletion). Thus, an
3There is a third possibility when the worker faces relative losses in both states of nature. However, her
expected utility is below the expected utility of one of the two other cases. See appendix A for further details.
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increase in the reference level will increase the time allocated to the risky job and also leisure
time, while such a change reduces the time allocation to the safe job. When the reference level
is very high, the worker will avoid allocating time to the safe job, just like in the case when
the reference level is very low. Thus, in the case of the very high reference level any further
increases in the reference level will increase time allocated to the risky job by taking away
time from leisure just like in the case with the very low reference level. Furthermore, when
the reference level is relatively high, the optimal time allocated to the three activities depends
on the loss aversion parameter. An increase in loss aversion will reduce time allocated to the
risky job and leisure but will increase time allocation to the safe job. An increase in any wage
rate is welcoming news to the worker as it increases expected utility (enrichment). In the case
whereby the individual undertakes all three activities, an increase in the wage rate in the bad
state of nature will increase time allocated to the risky job and the leisure. Offsetting these
increases is a decrease in time allocated to the safe job. On the other hand, an increase in
the wage rate in the good state of nature will reduce time in the risky activity if loss aversion
is higher than a threshold, and unambiguously stimulate leisure time while the effect on time
spent on the safe job is ambiguous. However, the effect of time spent in the risky job is also
ambiguous for less loss averse workers. Finally, an increase in the wage rate in the safe job
will reduce time in the risky job, reduce leisure and increase time in the safe job.
The next section presents the model. This is followed by describing the optimal solutions
assuming a low reference level with comparative statics presented, including changes in the
wage rate. Then optimal solutions with high reference level are explored with the corre-
sponding comparative static analysis. Some concluding remarks are offered at the end of the
paper.
2 Model
The model assumes that a hypothetical worker is deciding on the allocation of her time
endowment, T > 0, towards a safe job in the amount of L ≥ 0, towards a risky job, J ≥ 0,
and towards leisure time, E ≥ 0, such that L + J + E = T . The safe job yields the wage
rate of wa > 0. The risky job has an uncertain wage rate w and can yield wg, a wage rate
higher than that of the safe job, with probability p. However, it might also yield a lower
wage rate of wb > 0 with probability 1 − p. The lower wage rate wb > 0 can be considered
as a minimum wage rate regulated by the government. Hence, the wage rates are such that
0 < wb < wa < wg. In addition, we assume that the expected wage of the risky job is higher
than the wage of the safe job, i.e., E(w) = pwg +(1− p)wb > wa or p >
wa−wb
wg−wb
≡ pL, in order
to induce the worker to undertake the second job which is more risky.
The worker has reference dependent preferences, i.e., when deciding about allocation of
time to the two different jobs and to leisure, she evaluates her final income as gains or losses
6
relative to a reference level, Ŷ ≥ 0, to benchmark her final income and to derive her utility.
The reference level might have important implications as to how the worker will allocate her
time to the three activities and also how she responds to changes in the exogenous variables.
Income earnings (and therefore consumption) from the two jobs, is given by Ys = waL+wsJ,
s ∈ {b, g}. Thus, the final income net of the reference level, Ys − Ŷ , i ∈ {b, g}, is uncertain
and equals
Ys − Ŷ = waL+ wsJ − Ŷ = (ws − wa)J + wa(T − E)− Ŷ
The worker can earn wa(T−E) with certainty by allocating (T−E) of her time to the safe job,
but can make more earnings by taking the risky job if the good state of nature materializes.
The worker is assumed to maximize expectation of the following utility function that is
the sum of the power utility of the leisure and the prospect theory value function4
U(E, J) =
E1−γ
1− γ
+ V (Y − Ŷ ) (1)
where the value function V (·) is given as
V (Y − Ŷ ) =







(Y−Ŷ )1−γ
1−γ , Y ≥ Ŷ
−λ (Ŷ−Y )
1−γ
1−γ , Y < Ŷ
for λ > 1, with λ being the loss aversion parameter. Thus, the worker’s reduction in utility
arising from a loss in her income is greater (in absolute terms) than the marginal utility from a
gain in income (of the same size) near the reference level. This is thus consistent with the fact
that workers are more sensitive to a (relative) loss in their income (i.e., income below their
reference level) than when they experience relative gain (i.e., income above their reference
level). Another feature of the S-shaped value function is that workers are risk averse in the
domain of gains (preference for certain smaller gains over uncertain larger gains), but become
risk seekers (risk lovers) in the domain of losses (preference for uncertain large losses over
small certain losses).
Thus, the worker is assumed to choose the amount of time allocated to the risky job and
leisure by solving
Max(E,J) E(U(E, J)) = Max(E,J)
[
E1−γ
1−γ + E(V (Y − Ŷ ))
]
such that : Y − Ŷ = (w − wa)J + wa(T − E)− Ŷ
J, E ≥ 0, J +E ≤ T
(2)
4We assume leisure enters the utility function separately and that leisure, like relative income, has a constant
diminishing sensitivity measured by γ. Although the preferences are restricted, they are commonly used in
economic models (see Bodie et al., 1992, among others).
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Next sections shed more light on how time allocation among safe job, risky job and leisure
depend on the size of the reference level of income for sufficiently loss averse worker.
3 Low reference levels
In this section we consider a worker that has relatively low reference levels and is sufficiently
loss averse towards risk taking. There are two cases to consider. First, a relatively low
reference level, such that max {0, wLT} ≤ Ŷ ≤ waT , which is described in proposition 1
below and second, even a lower reference level, such that Ŷ < wLT , if the probability of the
good state to occur is sufficiently high. The solution of the latter case is given in proposition
2. Under proposition 1 a sufficiently loss averse worker will undertake the risky job with the
hope it will increase its earnings while working also in the safe job diversifying further its risk.
The worker will allocate some time also to her leisure that is proportional to the maximum
amount a worker can earn in the safe job net of the reference level. The amount of time the
worker allocates to the risky job is proportional to the optimal leisure time.
Proposition 1 Let max {0, wLT} ≤ Ŷ ≤ waT and λ > max
{
1
Kγ
,
(
wa
k2
)γ}
, where Kγ , k2 and
wL are given by (15), (18) and (19). Then problem (2) obtains its maximum at (J
∗, E∗) =
(
JP1, EP1
)
where
JP1 =
1−K1/γ
wa − wb
·
k
(
waT − Ŷ
)
k
(
1 +K
1/γ
γ
)
+wa
=
1−K1/γ
wa − wb
k EP1, (3)
EP1 =
waT − Ŷ
k
(
1 +K
1/γ
γ
)
+ wa
and (4)
LP1 = T − JP1 −EP1 (5)
with K and k being defined by (16) and (17).
Proof. The statement of the proposition follows directly from Appendix A, namely from
(S1-P1), (S3-P2), (S5-P2) and (S2-P3).
Note that for Ŷ < waT is 0 < J
P1, EP1, LP1 < T . Note in addition that (54), (55) and
(56) in Appendix A provide the explicit formulations of Y P1g , Y
P1
b and E
(
U
(
JP1, JP1
))
and
imply that Y P1g > Y
P1
b > Ŷ and E
(
U
(
JP1, EP1
))
> 0 when Ŷ < waT . Note in addition
that loss averse worker will avoid the risky job and leisure and thus allocate all her time to
the safe job if her reference level coincides with the maximum earnings she can obtain from
the safe job, i.e., when Ŷ = waT .
Under proposition 2 below, the sufficiently loss averse worker, with a lower reference
level than that considered in proposition 1, allocates no time to the safe job. The optimal
time allocated to the risky job is expressed in an implicit form while the remaining time
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is allocated to the leisure. Both solutions, time allocated to the risky job as well as time
allocated to the leisure, are independent of worker’s degree of loss aversion but in order for
such conditions to evolve and for the worker to take both jobs, she has to be sufficiently loss
averse. Under proposition 1 the household has to have a loss aversion parameter such that
λ > max
{
1
Kγ
,
(
wa
k2
)γ}
, while under proposition 2, when worker has even lower reference level
for income, the loss aversion parameter must be λ >
(
wa
k2
)γ
and the probability of the good
state of nature high enough, namely p > pU , in order to induce the worker to leave the safe
job and undertake only the risky job.
Proposition 2 Let 0 ≤ Ŷ < wLT , λ >
(
wa
k2
)γ
and p > pU where wL is given by (19) and
pU is given by (24). Then problem (2) obtains its maximum at (J
∗, E∗) =
(
JP1, EP1
)
where
JP1 ∈
(
Ŷ
wb
, T
)
is the solution of
−(T − J)−γ + p
(
wg J − Ŷ
)
−γ
wg + (1− p)
(
wb J − Ŷ
)
−γ
wb = 0 (6)
EP1 = T − JP1 (7)
LP1 = 0 (8)
Proof. The statement of the proposition follows directly from the Appendix A, namely
from (S2-P1), (S5-P2) and (S2-P3).
Note that wL > 0 if and only if p > pU . Note in addition that 0 < J
P1, EP1 < T ,
Y P1g = wgJ
P1 > Ŷ , Y P1b = wbJ
P1 > Ŷ and E
(
U
(
JP1
))
is given by (79).
3.1 Reference level
Under proposition 1 an increase in the reference level will cause the amount of time allocated
to the risky job and leisure to fall and thus more time is allocated to the safe job. On the
other hand, in case when the worker does not undertake the safe job, i.e., when the reference
level is even lower than the one stated in proposition 1, an increase in the reference level
will stimulate interest to undertake more of the risky job while trading off some leisure time.
Under both proposition 1 and proposition 2 the impact of an increase in the reference level
reduces relative gains in both states of nature and leads to a lower expected utility.
3.2 Time endowment
Under proposition 1 an increase in the time endowment will increase leisure time and also
time allocated to the risky job. The impact on the safe job depends on the value of the
probability of the good state of nature from occurring. If the probability is relatively low
then the additional time will also be allocated to the safe job while if the probability of the
good state of nature is high then time allocated to the safe job will fall. Under proposition
9
2, whereby the worker does not hold a safe job, an increase in time endowment will increase
time allocated to the risky job and to leisure (as in proposition 1). In both cases an increase
in time endowment is welcome news to the worker in that relative gains in both states of
nature increase and so does expected utility.
3.3 Wage rates
An increase in the wage rate of the risky job in either the bad state or the good state of
nature under proposition 1 will cause an increase in time allocated to the risky job, a decline
in leisure time and time allocated to the safe job, an increase in relative gains in the good state
of nature and a decline in relative gains in the bad state of nature but overall an increase in
happiness5 as the effect of an increase in relative gains in the good state of nature is stronger
than the decline in relative gains in the bad state of nature and the decline in the leisure.
Under proposition 2, the effect of an increase in the wage rate in either the bad state or
the good state is ambiguous for risky job, leisure and relative gains. Namely, an increase of
the wage of the risky job will increase time allocated to the risky job, reduce leisure time
with no effect on the safe job only when the already low reference level is below a certain
threshold level. Relative gains in both states of nature will increase only if the low reference
level is lower than the threshold level. The opposite dynamics applies when the reference level
exceeds a threshold level. However, expected utility will increase within this low reference
level.
An increase in the wage rate of the safe job under proposition 1 has ambiguous effects on
the time allocated to the risky and safe job due to the conflicting income and substitution
effects. Ambiguous is also the effect on leisure and relative gains in the good state of nature
but there is an increase in relative gains in the bad state of nature which is sufficient enough to
increase expected utility. Leisure activity will increase if the probability of the good state of
nature is higher than a threshold or if the threshold level is sufficiently high. For proposition
2 a change in the wage rate of the safe job has no effect on the decision variables. On the
other hand, if the probability of the good state to occur and the income reference levels
are sufficiently low then, under proposition 1, an increase in the wage rate of the safe job
stimulates the interest to undertake more of the safe job while trading off time allocated to
the risky job and leisure time.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the sensitivity results related to propositions 1 and 2 which
have been discussed above.
5By happiness we understand the indirect utility function.
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Table 1: Sensitivity analysis when max{0, wLT} ≤ Ŷ ≤ waT , ŶT =
(1−γ)(−wL)waT
γwa−wL
.
dJ∗ dE∗ dL∗ d
(
Y ∗g − Ŷ
)
d
(
Y ∗b − Ŷ
)
dU(E∗)
dλ = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0
dŶ < 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 < 0 < 0
dT > 0 > 0 ≷ 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
> 0
for p < pU
< 0
for p > pU
dwg > 0 < 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 > 0
dwa ≷ 0 ≷ 0 ≷ 0 ≷ 0 > 0 > 0
> 0
for p > pU
or
for p < pU
Ŷ > ŶT
< 0 < 0 > 0 < 0
p < pU p < pU p < pU p < pU
Ŷ < ŶT Ŷ < ŶT Ŷ < ŶT Ŷ < ŶT
dwb > 0 < 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 > 0
4 High reference levels
The next two propositions present solutions to problem (2) when the reference level is set at
relatively high level. In proposition 3 the reference level is such that is exceeds the threshold
level waT , i.e., Ŷ > waT , but it is below another threshold level as described in proposition
3. Finally, proposition 4 presents results for largest reference levels up to wgT . Proposition
3 has explicit solution of all three activities undertaken and worker thus allocates non-zero
time to both jobs and leisure. Unlike for lower values of the reference level, for higher values
of reference level for income, the solution, i.e., time allocation towards risky job, safe job and
leisure, depends on the worker’s degree of loss aversion. The optimal solution for leisure is
proportional to the reference level net of the maximum amount the worker can earn in the
safe job and time allocated to the risky job is proportional to the leisure time (as in the case
with the low reference level).
Proposition 3 Let waT < Ŷ ≤ min
{
wU , w
P3
U
}
T and λ > max
{
λP2,
[
(wg−wa)Ŷ
(wgT−Ŷ )k2
]γ}
, where
k2, wU , w
P3
U and λ
P2 are given by (18), (20), (21) and (22). Then problem (2) obtains its
11
Table 2: Sensitivity analysis when Ŷ < wLT and p > pU =
wa−wb
(wg−wa)
(
wb
wg
)γ
+wa−wb
.
Note that ŶU = wbJ
∗ − [(1− p)wb(wg − wb)]
1
1+γ (T − J∗), ŶU,wg = (1− γ)wgJ
∗
dJ∗ dE∗ dL∗ d
(
Y ∗g − Ŷ
)
d
(
Y ∗b − Ŷ
)
dU(E∗)
dλ = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0
dŶ > 0 < 0 = 0 < 0 < 0 < 0
when when
Ŷ < ŶU Ŷ < ŶU
dT > 0 > 0 = 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
dwg ≷ 0 ≶ 0 = 0 ≷ 0 ≷ 0 > 0
> 0 < 0 > 0 > 0
when when when when
Ŷ < ŶU,wg Ŷ < ŶU,wg Ŷ < ŶU,wg Ŷ < ŶU,wg
< 0 > 0 < 0 < 0
when when when when
Ŷ > ŶU,wg Ŷ > ŶU,wg Ŷ > ŶU,wg Ŷ > ŶU,wg
dwa = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0
dwb ≷ 0 ≶ 0 = 0 ≷ 0 ≷ 0 > 0
> 0 < 0 > 0 > 0
when when when when
Ŷ < ŶU,wb Ŷ < ŶU,wb Ŷ < ŶU,wb Ŷ < ŶU,wb
< 0 > 0 < 0 < 0
when when when when
Ŷ > ŶU,wb Ŷ > ŶU,wb Ŷ > ŶU,wb Ŷ > ŶU,wb
maximum at (J∗, E∗) =
(
JP2, EP2
)
where
JP2 =
1 + (λK)1/γ
wa − wb
·
k
(
Ŷ − waT
)
k
[
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
]
− wa
=
1 + (λK)1/γ
wa − wb
k EP2 (9)
EP2 =
Ŷ − waT
k
[
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
]
− wa
(10)
LP2 = T − JP2 −EP2 (11)
with Kγ , K and k being define by (15), (16) and (17).
Proof. The statement of the proposition follows directly from the Appendix A, namely from
(S4-P1), (S1-P2) and (S1-P3).
Note that 0 < JP2, EP2, LP2 < T . Note in addition that (98), (99) and (100) in Appendix
A provide the explicit formulations of Y P2g , Y
P2
b and E
(
U
(
JP2, JP2
))
and imply that Y P2g >
Ŷ , Y P2b < Ŷ and E
(
U
(
JP2, EP2
))
< 0.
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For the largest values of income reference levels the worker allocates her time among the
risky job and leisure while she avoids completely the safe job (similar to proposition 2 which
presents results for the lowest values of reference levels). The following proposition presents
results for this case and the optimal time allocated to the risky job is expressed in the implicit
form.
Proposition 4 Let max
{
wU , w
P3
U
}
T ≤ Ŷ ≤ wgT and λ > λ
P2, where wU , w
P3
U and λ
P2 are
given by (20), (21) and (22). Then problem (2) obtains its maximum at (J∗, E∗) =
(
JP2, EP2
)
where JP2 ∈
(
Ŷ
wg
, T
)
is the solution of
−(T − J)−γ + p
(
wg J − Ŷ
)
−γ
wg + λ(1− p)
(
Ŷ − wb J
)
−γ
wb = 0 (12)
EP2 = T − JP2 (13)
LP2 = 0 (14)
Proof. The statement of the proposition follows directly from Appendix A, namely from
(S4-P1), (S2-P2) and (S3-P3).
Note that 0 < JP2, EP2 < T . Note in addition that Y P2g = wgJ
P2 > Ŷ , Y P2b = wbJ
P2 <
Ŷ and E
(
U
(
JP2
))
is given by (130).
Comparative static analysis is shown in table 3 for proposition 3 and table 4 for proposition
4.
4.1 Loss Aversion
Under proposition 3 an increase in a worker’s degree of the loss aversion (λ) makes the risky
job and leisure less attractive while increases the attractiveness towards the safe job. There
is a reduction in relative gains in the good state of nature as well as in relative losses in the
bad state of nature and happiness level declines as well. Thus, a marginal reduction in the
loss averse parameter can lead to increase happiness.
We do not report sensitivity analysis of solutions with respect to the degree of loss aversion
for reference levels such that max{wU , w
P3
U }T < Ŷ ≤ wgT , as both wU and w
P3
U are increasing
functions in λ, such that lim (wU )λ→+∞ = lim
(
wP3U
)
λ→+∞
= wg. This and proposition 3
imply that for waT < Ŷ ≤ wgT the following holds
lim J∗λ→+∞ =
Ŷ − waT
wg − wa
limE∗λ→+∞ = 0
limL∗λ→+∞ =
wgT − Ŷ
wg − wa
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Thus, an extremely loss averse worker has a tendency to decrease leisure time to zero and
allocate its time between the safe job and the risky job.
4.2 Reference level
An increase in the reference level, when the reference level is already relatively high to start
with, will cause an increase in the time allocated to the risky job, an increase in leisure time
and a reduction in time allocated to the safe job which is the opposite to the case when the
worker has a relatively low reference level (proposition 1). At even higher reference level, as
in proposition 4, we observe a trade-off between time allocated between risky job and leisure
time. Namely an increase in the reference level leads to an increase in time allocated to the
risky job and a reduction in leisure time (table 4). Table 3 also shows that an increase in the
reference level will increase relative gains in the good state of nature as well as the relative
losses in the bad state of nature. An increase in relative losses has the strongest effect on
the level of worker’s happiness which decreases with increasing reference level. At the highest
reference levels (proposition 4) an increase in the reference level will increase relative gains in
the good state of nature but reduce relative losses in the bad state of nature. As an increase
in reference level for income leads to a reduction in happiness also in this case, then this is
caused by the reduction of time allocated to the leisure.
4.3 Time Endowment
Under proposition 3 an increase in time endowment will increase time allocated in the safe
job but reduce time allocated in the risky job and leisure (as in case when the degree of
loss aversion was increased). An increase in the time endowment will reduce relative gains
in the good state of nature as well as relative losses in the bad state of nature but increase
expected utility, which is thus caused by the reduction of relative losses in the bad state of
nature. Under proposition 4 the worker uses the increased time endowment for more leisure
time while time allocated to the risky job decreases. Relative gains in the good state of
nature fall and relative losses in the bad state of nature increase. As indirect utility function
(happiness) increases with increased time endowment then this is caused by increased time
to leisure. Note that these effects are in opposite direction than effects caused by the change
in the reference level.
4.4 Wage Rates
Under proposition 3 an increase in the wage rate in the good state of nature has an ambiguous
effect on time allocated to the risky job. However, for sufficiently large degree of loss aversion
is time allocated to the risky job reduced which is opposite to the effect it had when the
reference level was low (proposition 1). Leisure time will increase, while time allocated in the
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safe job is also ambiguous. Relative gains in the good state of nature will increase while effect
on relative losses is again ambiguous. However, if loss aversion is above the threshold level
then relative losses will decrease. Note that an increase of any wage rate increases indirect
utility (happiness). Under proposition 3 an increase in the wage rate in the bad state of
nature will increase the time allocated to the risky job and to leisure while reducing the time
allocated to the safe job. Relative gains increase in the good state of nature while again the
effect on relative losses is ambiguous but they also increase provided loss aversion exceeds
certain threshold level. An increase in the wage rate of the safe job under proposition 3 will
reduce time allocated to the risky job, reduce leisure time and increase time allocated in the
safe job. Relative gains in the good state of nature will fall as well as relative losses in the
bad state of nature which has stronger effect than decline in leisure time and in relative gains
(in good state of nature) as happiness increases with increased wage rate of the safe job.
The following holds for a sufficiently loss averse worker with highest reference level, as
stated in proposition 4. An increase in the wage rate in the good state of nature will increase
time allocated to the risky job, reduce leisure, increase relative gains in the good state of nature
and decrease relative losses in the bad state of nature if the reference level is sufficiently high.
An opposite comparative statics applies when the reference level is somehow smaller. An
increase in the wage rate in the bad state of nature will unambiguously reduce time allocated
to the risky job and increase leisure time (which has the main effect on the increase of the
happiness level), decrease relative gains in the good state of nature and increase relative losses
in the bad state of nature. This might look counter-intuitive (that an increase of the wage
rate of the risky job in the bad state of nature decreases time allocated into the risky job.
However, utility function of the worker with prospect theory based preferences implies, see
(1), that the leisure time enters her utility function separately and thus has a strong role in
determining her happiness level. Note that happiness level will increase with an increase in
the wage rates in either the good or bad state of nature. Finally, an increase in the wage rate
in the safe job has no effect on the decision variables since the worker allocates her time only
to the risky job and leisure.
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Table 3: Sensitivity analysis when waT ≤ Ŷ ≤ min{wU , w
P3
U }T .
Note that λ̂ = 1γKγ
[
1 + wak + (1− γ)
wg−wa
wa−wb
]γ
.
dJ∗ dE∗ dL∗ d
(
Y ∗g − Ŷ
)
d
(
Ŷ − Y ∗b
)
dU(E∗)
dλ < 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 < 0 < 0
dŶ > 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 < 0
dT < 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 < 0 > 0
dwg ≷ 0 > 0 ≷ 0 > 0 ≷ 0 > 0
< 0 < 0
when when
λ > λ̂ λ > λ̂
dwa < 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 < 0 > 0
dwb > 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 ≷ 0 > 0
< 0
when
λ > λ̂
Table 4: Sensitivity analysis when max{wU , w
P3
U }T ≤ Ŷ ≤ wgT and when λ is sufficiently
large.
dJ∗ dE∗ dL∗ d
(
Y ∗g − Ŷ
)
d
(
Ŷ − Y ∗b
)
dU(E∗)
dŶ > 0 < 0 = 0 > 0 < 0 < 0
dT < 0 > 0 = 0 < 0 > 0 > 0
dwg ≷ 0 ≶ 0 = 0 ≷ 0 ≶ 0 > 0
> 0 < 0 > 0 < 0
when when when when
Ŷ > ŶU,wg Ŷ > ŶU,wg Ŷ > ŶU,wg Ŷ > ŶU,wg
< 0 > 0 < 0 > 0
when when when when
Ŷ < ŶU,wg Ŷ < ŶU,wg Ŷ < ŶU,wg Ŷ < ŶU,wg
dwa = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0
dwb < 0 > 0 = 0 < 0 > 0 > 0
5 Conclusion
Workers who face financial constraints or an economic need or have aspirations for belonging
in an income group, engage in holding more than one job. In this paper a positive analysis
is conducted to determine the role of the reference level and loss aversion in the allocation of
time to leisure, a safe and a risky job. The worker has a choice to make decisions based on
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whether she wants to face relative losses in any state of nature. If the worker is interested in
avoiding relative losses then she has a low reference level for her income and allocates time
between the three activities in such a way that she avoids these losses in any state of nature.
Leisure time under such case is a normal good and work effort is inferior as it is normally in a
neoclassical setting. However, in the case whereby the worker has a high reference level, say
high aspirations to belong to a higher income class, leisure becomes an inferior good while
work effort is now normal. Changes in the reference level thus have implications in terms of
re-allocation of time between the activities. At low reference level and when time is allocated
to all three activities an increase in the reference level will reduce leisure, reduce time allocated
in the risky job and increase time allocated in the safe job. But when the reference level is high
and the worker allocates her time across all three activities, an increase in the reference level
will increase leisure, increase time allocated to the risky job and reduce time allocated in the
safe job. An increase in the wage rate of the safe job, say due to lower taxes, is inconclusive
in terms of stimulating time allocated to the safe job when the reference level is low. This
is due to the conflicting income and substitution effects that are in operation. But when
the reference level is high and work effort is normal then the income and substitution effects
operate in the same direction and time allocated to the safe job increases with an increase
in the wage rate of the safe job while time is taken away from leisure and the risky job. An
increase in the wage rate in the bad state of nature stimulates time allocated to the risky job
under most cases without any additional conditions. Assuming that the wage rate in the bad
state of nature is bounded by minimum wage laws then an increase in the minimum wage
rate can lead to increasing time allocation to the risky job but can come at the expense of
time allocated to the safe job and leisure time when the reference level for income is low.
This paper is focussed on a positive analysis and did not look into normative issues.
There are a number of potential extensions that are worthwhile undertaking. One can force
the worker’s time allocated to the safe job to be less than the optimal due to constraints
on the number of hours available for her to work in her safe job and analyze the impact
this has on decision to hold more than one job. Another extension is to introduce a wage
tax and autonomous taxes and conduct a differential incidence analysis. A wage tax yields
similar results to a reduction in wage rate that has been explored in this paper but equally an
increase in autonomous taxes can be seen as a reduction in the reference level which impacts
have been analyzed in this paper as well. Hence, a budget balanced analysis whereby the
government say reduces the wage tax but increases autonomous taxes to make up for the loss
of tax revenue and seeing the effects of such a policy change on time allocation and happiness
is worth exploring.
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Appendix A
Let us introduce the following notation
Kγ =
(1− p)(wa − wb)
1−γ
p (wg − wa)1−γ
(15)
K =
(1− p)(wa − wb)
p (wg − wa)
(16)
k =
[
wap
(
wg − wb
wa −wb
)1−γ
]1/γ
(17)
k2 =
[
wa(1− p)
(
wg − wb
wg − wa
)1−γ
]1/γ
= kK1/γγ (18)
wL =
wb − wg K
1/γ
1−K1/γ + wa−wbk
(19)
wU = wU (λ) =
wb + wg (λK)
1/γ
1 + (λK)1/γ + wa−wbk
(20)
wP3U = w
P3
U (λ) =
wg
1 +
wg−wa
λ1/γk2
(21)
λP2 =
(
1
K
1/γ
γ
+
wa
k2
)γ
(22)
λ̂ =
1
γKγ
[
1 +
wa
k
+ (1− γ)
wg − wa
wa − wb
]γ
(23)
pU =
wa − wb
(wg − wa)
(
wb
wg
)γ
+ wa − wb
(24)
Note that wU (λ) and w
P3
U (λ) are increasing functions in λ and lim(wU )λ→+∞ = lim(w
P3
U )λ→+∞ =
wg. The following holds
d
dwg
k
(
K1/γγ + 1
)
=
1− γ
γ
k
wg − wb
(
1−K1/γ
)
> 0 for p > pL (25)
d
dwg
k
[
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
]
= −
1− γ
γ
k
wg − wb
[
1 + (λK)1/γ
]
< 0 (26)
d
dwg
k
[
1 + (λK)1/γ
]
=
k
γ(wg − wb)
[
1− γ +
(1− γ)(wg − wa)− (wg − wb)
wg − wa
(λK)1/γ
]
< 0 for λ >
1
Kγ
d
dwg
k =
1− γ
γ
k
wg − wb
> 0 (27)
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d
dwg
k2 = −
1− γ
γ
k
wg − wb
K1/γ < 0 (28)
d
dwg
(k + k2) =
1− γ
γ
k
wg − wb
(
1−K1/γ
)
> 0 for p > pL (29)
d
dwg
K1/γ = −
1
γ
K1/γ
wg − wa
(30)
d
dwg
K1/γγ = −
1− γ
γ
K1/γ
wa − wb
(31)
d
dwb
k =
1− γ
γ
k
wg − wb
wg − wa
wa −wb
> 0 (32)
d
dwb
k
(
K1/γγ + 1
)
=
1− γ
γ
k
wg − wb
(
1−K1/γ
) wg − wa
wa − wb
> 0 for p > pL (33)
d
dwb
K1/γ = −
1
γ
K1/γ
wa − wb
(34)
d
dwb
K1/γγ = −
1− γ
γ
K
1/γ
γ
wa − wb
= −
1− γ
γ
wg − wa
(wa − wb)2
K1/γ (35)
d
dwb
(
1−K1/γ
)
k
wa − wb
=
(
1−K1/γ
)
k
γ(wa − wb)2
[
K1/γ
1−K1/γ
+
wg − wa + γ(wa − wb)
wg − wb
]
(36)
d
dwb
k
[
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
]
= −
1− γ
γ
k
wg − wb
[
(λKγ)
1/γ −
wg − wa
wa − wb
]
< for λ >
1
Kγ
(
wg − wa
wa − wb
)γ
(37)
d
dwb
1 + (λK)1/γ
wa − wb
k =
k
γ(wa − wb)(wg − wb)
[
wg − wb
wa − wb
− (1− γ)
(
1 + (λK)1/γ
)
]
(38)
d
dwa
K1/γγ =
1− γ
γ
wg − wb
(wg − wa)(wa − wb)
K1/γγ (39)
d
dwa
K1/γ =
1
γ
wg − wb
(wg − wa)(wa −wb)
K1/γ (40)
d
dwa
k =
k
γ
γwa − wb
wa(wa −wb)
(41)
d
dwa
k
(
1 +K1/γγ
)
=
k
γwa
[
γwa − wb
wa − wb
+
wg − γwa
wg − wa
K1/γγ
]
=
k
γwa(wa −wb)
[
γwa
(
1−K1/γ
)
+ wgK
1/γ − wb
]
d
dwa
k
[
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
]
=
k
γwa
[
wg − γwa
wg − wa
(λKγ)
1/γ −
γwa − wb
wa − wb
]
22
d
dwa
k
wa
[
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
]
=
1− γ
γ
k
w2a(wa − wb)
[
wg (λK)
1/γ + wb
]
> 0
d
dwa
k
wa − wb
= −
wb
γwa(wa − wb)2
k (42)
d
dwa
(
1−K1/γ
) k
wa − wb
= −
k
γwa(wa − wb)2
[
wb +
wg(wa − wb)
wg − wa
K1/γ
]
(43)
d
dwa
K1/γ
k
wa − wb
=
kK1/γwg
γwa(wa − wb)(wg − wa)
> 0 (44)
d
dwa
[
1 + (λK)1/γ
] k
wa − wb
=
k
γwa(wa − wb)2
[
wg(wa − wb)
wg − wa
(λK)1/γ −wb
]
(45)
There are three cases to consider:
(P1) Ŷ ≤ Yb ≤ Yg
(P2) Yb ≤ Ŷ ≤ Yg
(P3) Yb ≤ Yg ≤ Ŷ
The proofs are conducted in such a way that for each of the three cases the corresponding
problem is formulated and maximum (maxima) of each problems are compared among them-
selves and the largest one is the maximum of (2).
Note in addition that for Ŷ ≤ waT is point
(
J = 0, E = T − Ŷwa
)
feasible for all three
cases/problems as then Yg = Yb = Ŷ . The value of the corresponding utility function is
(
T− Ŷ
wa
)1−γ
1−γ .
Problem (P1):
Max(J,E) : E(U(J,E)) =
E1−γ
1−γ + p
[(wg−wa)J+wa(T−E)−Ŷ ]
1−γ
1−γ + (1− p)
[−(wa−wb)J+wa(T−E)−Ŷ ]
1−γ
1−γ
such that : Ŷ ≤ wa (T − E)− (wa − wb)J
J + E ≤ T
J, E ≥ 0

















(P1)
Note that the necessary condition for feasibility is that Ŷ ≤ wa T .
6
6This follows from Yb ≥ Ŷ and thus from Ŷ ≤ wa (T − E)− (wa − wb)J .
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The first order conditions (FOC) are
dE(U)
dJ = p
[
(wg − wa)J + wa(T − E)− Ŷ
]
−γ
(wg − wa)
−(1− p)
[
−(wa − wb)J + wa(T − E)− Ŷ
]
−γ
(wa − wb) = 0
dE(U)
dE = E
−γ − p
[
(wg − wa)J + wa(T −E)− Ŷ
]
−γ
wa
−(1− p)
[
−(wa − wb)J + wa(T − E)− Ŷ
]
−γ
wa = 0





















(46)
dE(U)
dJ = 0 from (46) implies the following
p
[
−(wa − wb)J + wa(T − E)− Ŷ
]γ
(wg − wa) = (1− p)
[
(wg − wa)J + wa(T − E)− Ŷ
]γ
(wa −wb)
This implies that
J =
1−K1/γ
wa −wb +K1/γ(wg − wa)
[
wa(T − E)− Ŷ
]
=
1−K1/γ
(wa − wb)
(
1 +K
1/γ
γ
)
[
wa(T − E)− Ŷ
]
(47)
If we plug the last expression for J , namely (47) into dE(U)dE = 0 in (46), we obtain
E−γ = pwa
[
wa(T − E)− Ŷ
]
−γ
(
1 +
1−K1/γ
1 +K
1/γ
γ
wg − wa
wa −wb
)
−γ
(48)
+ (1− p)wa
[
wa(T − E)− Ŷ
]
−γ
(
1−
1−K1/γ
1 +K
1/γ
γ
)
−γ
After some simplifications we obtain
Eγ =
1
pwa
(
wa − wb
wg − wb
)1−γ
[
wa(T − E)− Ŷ
1 +K
1/γ
γ
]γ
(49)
which gives
E =
waT − Ŷ
k
(
1 +K
1/γ
γ
)
+ wa
= EP1 (50)
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where k is give by (17). After plugging EP1 into (47) we obtain
J =
1−K1/γ
wa − wb
·
k
(
waT − Ŷ
)
k
(
1 +K
1/γ
γ
)
+ wa
= JP1 (51)
and thus
LP1 = T − JP1 − EP1 = T −
waT − Ŷ
k
(
1 +K
1/γ
γ
)
+ wa
(
1 +
1−K1/γ
wa − wb
k
)
(52)
Note that (50) and (51) imply that
JP1 =
1−K1/γ
wa −wb
k EP1 (53)
Assumptions Ŷ ≤ wa T and E(w) > wa
7 imply that EP1 ≥ 0 and JP1 ≥ 0. Finally, JP1 +
EP1 ≤ T if
(
waT − Ŷ
)
(
k
1−K1/γ
wa − wb
+ 1
)
≤
[
k
(
1 +K1/γγ
)
+ wa
]
T
which holds when
Ŷ ≥
wb − wg K
1/γ
1−K1/γ + wa−wbk
T ≡ wL T
It can be easily shown that wL ≤ wb.
8 In addition, assumption Ŷ ≤ wa T implies that
Ŷ ≤ wa
(
T − EP1
)
− (wa − wb)J
P1 = Yb. Thus, for wLT < Ŷ ≤ waT and E(w) > wa is
(
EP1, JP1
)
an interior solution of (P1), and for Ŷ = wLT is J
P1 + EP1 = T , which implies
that LP1 = 0. Note in addition that
Y P1g − Ŷ =
wg − wb
wa − wb
·
k
(
waT − Ŷ
)
k
(
1 +K
1/γ
γ
)
+ wa
= k
wg − wb
wa − wb
EP1 (54)
Y P1b − Ŷ = K
1/γ
(
Y P1g − Ŷ
)
(55)
E(U(JP1, EP1)) =
[
1 + p1/γ
(
wa
wg − wb
wa − wb
)1/γ−1
(
1 +K1/γγ
)
]
(
EP1
)1−γ
1− γ
=
[
wa + k
(
1 +K1/γγ
)]γ (waT − Ŷ )
1−γ
wa(1− γ)
(56)
7Note that assumption E(w) > wa is equivalent to p >
wa−wb
wg−wb
.
8Note that wL < 0 if and onyl if p <
wa−wb
(wg−wa)
(
wb
wg
)γ
+wa−wb
≡ pU . Thus, for p ≥ pU is wL ≥ 0.
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Using (46), it is easy to verify that d
2
E(U)
dJ2 < 0,
d2E(U)
dE2 < 0, and ∇
2
E(U(J,E)) =
d2E(U)
dJ2
d2E(U)
dE2 −
(
d2E(U)
dJdE
)2
> 0, and thus problem (P1) is a concave programming problem
and (JP1, EP1) is its unique global maximum.
Note that the following holds from (50), (51), (54), (55) and (56)
dJP1
dŶ
= −
1−K1/γ
(wa − wb)
(
1 +K
1/γ
γ +
wa
k
) < 0 (57)
dEP1
dŶ
= −
1
k
(
1 +K
1/γ
γ
)
+ wa
< 0 (58)
dLP1
dŶ
=
d
(
T − JP1 − EP1
)
dŶ
> 0 (59)
d
(
Y P1g − Ŷ
)
dŶ
< 0 (60)
d
(
Y P1b − Ŷ
)
dŶ
< 0 (61)
dE(U(JP1, EP1))
dŶ
= −


wa + k
(
1 +K
1/γ
γ
)
waT − Ŷ


γ
1
wa
< 0 (62)
dEP1
dwg
= −
k
wg − wb
1− γ
γ
1−K1/γ
k
(
1 +K
1/γ
γ
)
+ wa
EP1 < 0 (63)
dJP1
dwg
=
k
γ
1−K1/γ
wa − wb


K1/γ
(wg −wa)
(
1−K1/γ
) +
1− γ
wg − wb
k
(
K1/γ +K
1/γ
γ
)
+ wa
k
(
1 +K
1/γ
γ
)
+ wa

EP1 > 0
(64)
dLP1
dwg
=
d
(
T − JP1 − EP1
)
dwg
< 0 (65)
dEP1
dwb
= −
k
wg − wb
1− γ
γ
1−K1/γ
k
(
1 +K
1/γ
γ
)
+ wa
wg − wa
wa −wb
EP1 < 0 (66)
dJP1
dwb
=
1− γ
γ
wg − wa
wg − wb
k
(wa − wb)2
[
(wa − wb)K
1/γ + γ1−γ (wg − wb)
wg − wa
+1−
(
1−K1/γ
)2
1 +K
1/γ
γ +
wa
k
]
EP1 > 0 (67)
dY P1g
dwb
=
k
γ
wg − wa
(wa − wb)2
[
1− (1− γ)
1−K1/γ
1 +K
1/γ
γ +
wa
k
]
EP1 > 0 (68)
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dY P1b
dwb
= −
k
γ
wg − wa
(wa − wb)2
K1/γ
[
wa − wb
wg − wa
+ (1− γ)
1−K1/γ
1 +K
1/γ
γ +
wa
k
]
EP1 < 0 (69)
dLP1
dwb
=
d
(
T − JP1 − EP1
)
dwb
< 0 (70)
[
k
(
1 +K1/γγ
)
+ wa
]2 dEP1
dwa
= Ŷ
[
1 +
k
wa − wb
(
1−K1/γ
)
+
k
γwa(wa −wb)
(
wgK
1/γ − wb
)
]
−(1− γ)waT
k
γwa(wa − wb)
(
wgK
1/γ − wb
)
=
wa − wb + k
(
1−K1/γ
)
γwa(wa − wb)
[
(γwa − wL)Ŷ + (1− γ)wL waT
]
(71)
> 0 if p > pU (i.e. wL > 0) or if p < pU and Ŷ >
(1− γ)(−wL)waT
γwa − wL
< 0 if p < pU (i.e. wL < 0) and Ŷ <
(1− γ)(−wL)waT
γwa − wL
(72)
Based on (42), (43), (54) and (72), the following holds for p < pU and Ŷ <
(1−γ)(−wL)waT
γwa−wL
dJP1
dwa
< 0 (73)
dLP1
dwa
> 0 (74)
d
(
Y P1g − Ŷ
)
dwa
< 0 (75)
Finally,
dE(U(JP1, EP1))
dwa
=
(1− γ)
[
wa − wb + k
(
1−K1/γ
)]
wa(wa −wb)
[
wa + k
(
1 +K
1/γ
γ
)]1−γ ·
Ŷ − wLT
(
waT − Ŷ
)γ
> 0 for wLT < Ŷ < waT (76)
It follows from above that for Ŷ < wLT is L
P1 = 0 which implies JP1 + EP1 = T , i.e.,
EP1 = T − JP1 and thus JP1 is solution of the following problem
MaxJ : E(U(J)) =
(T−J)1−γ
1−γ + p
(wgJ−Ŷ )
1−γ
1−γ + (1− p)
(wbJ−Ŷ )
1−γ
1−γ
such that : Ŷwb ≤ J ≤ T







(77)
As (77) is a convex programming problem its unique maximum is reached at the point J = JP1
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that satisfied the following FOC
dE(U)
dJ
= −(T − J)−γ + p
(
wg J − Ŷ
)
−γ
wg + (1− p)
(
wb J − Ŷ
)
−γ
wb = 0 (78)
Note that lim
J→ Ŷ
wb
dE(U)
dJ = +∞ and limJ→T
dE(U)
dJ = −∞ imply that the unique maximum
is an interior solution, i.e., JP1 ∈
(
Ŷ
wb
, T
)
and it satisfies the FOC (78). Note that JP1 is
solution of problem (77) for any value Ŷ such that Ŷ ≤ wLT . Finally, the following holds:
Y P1g = wgJ
P1 > Ŷ , Y P1b = wbJ
P1 > Ŷ and
E(U(JP1)) =
(T − JP1)1−γ
1− γ
+ p
(
wgJ
P1 − Ŷ
)1−γ
1− γ
+ (1− p)
(
wbJ
P1 − Ŷ
)1−γ
1− γ
(79)
Based on (78) and implicit function differentiation the following holds
dJP1
dŶ
=
p
(
wgJ
P1 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
wg + (1− p)
(
wbJ
P1 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
wb
(T − JP1)
−1−γ
+ p
(
wgJP1 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
w2g + (1− p)
(
wbJ
P1 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
w2b
> 0
(80)
dEP1
dŶ
=
d
(
T − JP1
)
dŶ
< 0 (81)
dLP1
dŶ
= 0 (82)
d
(
Y P1g − Ŷ
)
dŶ
=
(1− p)
(
wbJ
P1 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
(wg − wb)wb −
(
T − JP1
)
−1−γ
(T − JP1)−1−γ + p
(
wgJP1 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
w2g + (1− p)
(
wbJP1 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
w2b
< 0 for Ŷ < wbJ
∗ − [(1− p)wb(wg − wb)]
1
1+γ (T − J∗) (83)
d
(
Y P1b − Ŷ
)
dŶ
= −
(
T − JP1
)
−1−γ
+ p
(
wgJ
P1 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
(wg − wb)wg
(T − JP1)
−1−γ
+ p
(
wgJP1 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
w2g + (1− p)
(
wbJ
P1 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
w2b
< 0
dJP1
dwg
=
p
(
wgJ
P1 − Ŷ
)
−γ (
1
γ −
wgJP1
wgJP1−Ŷ
)
(T − JP1)
−1−γ
+ p
(
wgJP1 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
w2g + (1− p)
(
wbJ
P1 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
w2b
≷ 0
> 0 for Ŷ < (1− γ)wgJ
P1
< 0 for Ŷ > (1− γ)wgJ
P1 (84)
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E(U(JP1))
dwg
=
[
−(T − JP1)−γ + p
(
wg J
P1 − Ŷ
)
−γ
wg + (1− p)
(
wb J
P1 − Ŷ
)
−γ
wb
]
dJP1
dwg
+p
(
wgJ
P1 − Ŷ
)
−γ
JP1 = p
(
wgJ
P1 − Ŷ
)
−γ
JP1 > 0 (85)
dJP1
dwb
=
(1− p)
(
wbJ
P1 − Ŷ
)
−γ (
1
γ −
wbJ
P1
wbJP1−Ŷ
)
(T − JP1)−1−γ + p
(
wgJP1 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
w2g + (1− p)
(
wbJP1 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
w2b
≷ 0
> 0 for Ŷ < (1− γ)wbJ
P1
< 0 for Ŷ > (1− γ)wbJ
P1 (86)
E(U(JP1))
dwb
=
[
−(T − JP1)−γ + p
(
wg J
P1 − Ŷ
)
−γ
wg + (1− p)
(
wb J
P1 − Ŷ
)
−γ
wb
]
dJP1
dwb
+(1− p)
(
wbJ
P1 − Ŷ
)
−γ
JP1 = (1− p)
(
wbJ
P1 − Ŷ
)
−γ
JP1 > 0 (87)
(88)
Summary for (P1):
(S1-P1) For wLT < Ŷ < waT there exists a unique interior solution of (P1), namely
(
JP1, EP1
)
,
given by (51) and (50). Note that 0 < LP1 = T − JP1 − EP1 < T .
(S2-P1) For Ŷ ≤ wLT there exists a unique solution of (P1) such that J
P1 satisfies (78) and
EP1 = T − JP1. Note that LP1 = 0.
(S3-P1) Based on (50), (51), (54), (55) and (56), the following holds for Ŷ = waT : J
P1 = EP1 =
0, LP1 = T , Yg = Yb = Ŷ and E
(
U
(
JP1, EP1
))
) = 0.
(S4-P1) There is no feasible solution for (P1) when Ŷ > waT .
Problem (P2):
Max(J,E) : E(U(J,E)) =
E1−γ
1−γ + p
[(wg−wa)J+wa(T−E)−Ŷ ]
1−γ
1−γ −λ(1− p)
[Ŷ+(wa−wb)J−wa(T−E)]
1−γ
1−γ
such that : wa (T − E)− (wa − wb)J ≤ Ŷ ≤ wa (T −E) + (wg − wa)J
J + E ≤ T
J, E ≥ 0

















(P2)
Note that the necessary condition for Ŷ ≤ wa (T − E) + (wg − wa)J , and thus for Yg ≥ Ŷ ,
29
is that Ŷ ≤ wgT . The first order conditions are
dE(U)
dJ = p
[
(wg − wa)J + wa(T − E)− Ŷ
]
−γ
(wg − wa)
−λ(1− p)
[
Ŷ + (wa − wb)J − wa(T − E)
]
−γ
(wa − wb) = 0
dE(U)
dE = E
−γ − p
[
(wg − wa)J + wa(T − E)− Ŷ
]
−γ
wa
−λ(1− p)
[
Ŷ + (wa − wb)J − wa(T − E)
]
−γ
wa = 0





















(89)
dE(U)
dJ = 0 from (89) implies the following
p
[
Ŷ + (wa − wb)J − wa(T − E)
]γ
(wg − wa) = λ(1− p)
[
(wg − wa)J + wa(T − E)− Ŷ
]γ
(wa − wb)
This implies that
J =
1 + (λK)1/γ
(λK)1/γ (wg − wa)− (wa −wb)
[
Ŷ − wa(T − E)
]
=
1 + (λK)1/γ
(wa − wb)
[
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
]
[
Ŷ − wa(T − E)
]
(90)
As we consider sufficiently loss averse workers, the following needs to hold so that J ≥ 0:
λ > 1Kγ and Ŷ ≥ wa(T − E).
If we plug the last expression for J , namely (90) into dE(U)dE = 0 in (89), we obtain
E−γ = pwa
[
Ŷ − wa(T − E)
]
−γ
[
1 + (λK)1/γ
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
·
wg − wa
wa − wb
− 1
]
−γ
(91)
+ λ(1− p)wa
[
Ŷ −wa(T − E)
]
−γ
[
1 + (λK)1/γ
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
+ 1
]
−γ
After some simplifications we obtain
Eγ =
1
pwa
(
wa − wb
wg − wb
)1−γ
[
Ŷ − wa(T − E)
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
]γ
(92)
which gives
E =
Ŷ − waT
k
[
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
]
− wa
= EP2 (93)
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where k is given by (17). After plugging EP2 into (90) we obtain
J =
1 + (λK)1/γ
wa − wb
·
k
(
Ŷ − waT
)
k
[
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
]
− wa
= JP2 (94)
Note that (93) and (94) imply that
JP2 =
1 + (λK)1/γ
wa −wb
k EP2 (95)
Note in addition that JP2, EP2 > 0, see (94) and (93), if Ŷ > waT and λ >
(
1 + wak
)γ 1
Kγ
=
(
1
K
1/γ
γ
+ wak2
)γ
≡ λP2, EP2 ≥ 0 if λ > λP2 and JP2 + EP2 ≤ T if
(
Ŷ − waT
)
(
k
1 + (λK)1/γ
wa − wb
+ 1
)
≤
{
k
[
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
]
− wa
}
T (96)
which holds when
Ŷ ≤
wb + wg (λK)
1/γ
1 + (λK)1/γ + wa−wbk
T ≡ wU T (97)
Note finally that wU < wg and that λ > λ
P2 implies that wa ≤ wU and thus this solution is
feasible. Note in addition that
Y P2g − Ŷ =
wg − wb
wa − wb
·
k
(
Ŷ − waT
)
k
[
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
]
− wa
= k
wg − wb
wa − wb
EP2 > 0 (98)
Ŷ − Y P2b = (λK)
1/γ
(
Y P2g − Ŷ
)
> 0 (99)
E(U(JP2, EP2)) =
[
1 + p1/γ
(
wa
wg − wb
wa − wb
)1/γ−1
(
1− (λKγ)
1/γ
)
]
(
EP2
)1−γ
1− γ
= −
[
k
(
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
)
− wa
]γ (Ŷ −waT )
1−γ
wa(1− γ)
< 0 (100)
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Note that the following holds from (93), (95), (98), (99) and (100)
dJP2
dŶ
=
1 + (λK)1/γ
(wa − wb)
[
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1− wak
] > 0 (101)
dEP2
dŶ
=
1
k
[
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
]
− wa
> 0 (102)
dLP2
dŶ
=
d
(
T − JP2 − EP2
)
dŶ
< 0 (103)
d
(
Y P2g − Ŷ
)
dŶ
> 0 (104)
d
(
Ŷ − Y P2b
)
dŶ
> 0 (105)
dE(U(JP2, EP2))
dŶ
= −


k
(
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
)
− wa
Ŷ − waT


γ
1
wa
< 0 (106)
dJP2
dλ
= −
k2(Ŷ − waT )
γ(wa − wb)
K1/γλ1/γ−1
[
k
(
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
)
− wa
]2
(
wa
k
+
wg − wb
wa −wb
)
< 0
(107)
dEP2
dλ
= −
k(Ŷ − waT )K
1/γ
γ λ
1/γ−1
γ
[
k
(
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
)
− wa
]2 < 0 (108)
dLP2
dλ
=
d
(
T − JP2 − EP2
)
dŶ
> 0 (109)
d
(
Y P2g − Ŷ
)
dλ
< 0 (110)
d
(
Ŷ − Y P2b
)
dλ
= −K1/γk2
(
1 +
wa
k
) wg − wa
γ(wa − wb)
(
Ŷ − waT
)
λ1/γ−1 < 0 (111)
dE(U(JP2, EP2))
dλ
= −
[
k
(
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
)
− wa
]γ−1 (Ŷ − waT )
1−γ
wa(1− γ)
kK1/γγ λ
1/γ−1 < 0(112)
dEP2
dwg
=
1− γ
γ
k
wg − wb
[
1 + (λK)1/γ
] EP2
k
[
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
]
− wa
=
1− γ
γ
wa − wb
wg − wb
JP2
k
[
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
]
− wa
> 0 (113)
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d
(
Y P2g − Ŷ
)
dwg
=
[
(1− γ)
1 + (λK)1/γ
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1− wak
+ 1
]
k
γ(wa − wb)
EP2 > 0 (114)
d
(
Ŷ − Y P2b
)
dwg
=
[
(1− γ)
(λKγ)
1/γ +
wg−wa
wa−wb
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1− wak
− 1
]
(λK)1/γ k
γ(wg − wa)
EP2 ≷ 0
< 0 for λ >
1
Kγ
[
1 + wak
γ
+
(
1
γ
− 1
)
wg − wa
wa − wb
]γ
≡ λ̂ (115)
> 0 for λ < λ̂
dE(U(JP2, EP2))
dwg
=
[
k
wa
(
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
)
− 1
]
1 + (λK)1/γ
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1− wak
·
(
EP2
)1−γ
wg − wb
> 0
for λ > λP2 (116)
dEP2
dwb
=
1− γ
γ
·
k
wg − wb
·
(λKγ)
1/γ −
wg−wa
wa−wb
k
[
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
]
− wa
EP2
> 0 for λ >
1
Kγ
max
{
1,
(
wg − wa
wa − wb
)γ}
(117)
dJP2
dwb
=
k
γ(wa − wb)(wg − wb)
[
wg − wb
wa − wb
+ (1− γ)
1 + (λK)1/γ
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1− wak
(
1−
wg − wa
wa − wb
+
wa
k
)
]
EP2
(118)
d
(
Y P2g − Ŷ
)
dwb
=
k
γ
·
1
wa − wb
[
(1− γ)
(λKγ)
1/γ −
wg−wa
wa−wb
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1− wak
+
wg − wa
wa − wb
]
EP2
> 0 for λ > max
{
1
K
,
1
Kγ
(
1 +
wa
k
)γ
}
(119)
d
(
Ŷ − Y P2b
)
dwb
=
k
γ
·
(λK)1/γ
wa − wb
[
(1− γ)
(λKγ)
1/γ −
wg−wa
wa−wb
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1− wak
− 1
]
EP2 ≷ 0
< 0 for λ1/γ >
1
K
1/γ
γ
[
1 + wak
γ
−
(
1
γ
− 1
)
wg − wa
wa − wb
]
> 0 for λ1/γ <
1
K
1/γ
γ
[
1 + wak
γ
−
(
1
γ
− 1
)
wg − wa
wa − wb
]
(120)
dE(U(JP2, EP2))
dwb
=
[
(λKγ)
1/γ +
2− γ
γ
·
wg − wa
wa − wb
]
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1− kwa
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1− wak
·
(
EP2
)1−γ
wg −wb
> 0
for λ > λP2 (121)
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[
k
(
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
)
− wa
]2 dEP2
dwa
= −
wa − wb + k
[
(λK)1/γ + 1
]
γwa(wa − wb)
[
wU
(
Ŷ − waT
)
+ γwa
(
wUT − Ŷ
)]
< 0 (122)
d
(
Y P2g − Ŷ
)
dwa
=
(wg − wb)k
wa − wb
[
−
wb
γwa(wa − wb)
+
dEP2
dwa
]
< 0 (123)
dE(U(JP2, EP2))
dwa
=
(
wgT − Ŷ
)
k
wg − wa
(λKγ)
1/γ −
wbk
wa − wb
(
Ŷ
wa
− T
)
−
(
k
wa
+ 1
)
Ŷ
> 0 for λ >
(
wg − wa
wgT − Ŷ
)γ [
Ŷ − waT
wa − wb
+
(
1
wa
+
1
k
)
Ŷ
]γ
1
Kγ
(124)
Note that
d
(
Y P2g − Ŷ
)
dwa
=
d
dwa
[
(wg − wa)J
P2 + wa
(
T − EP2
)
− Ŷ
]
= −JP2 + (wg − wa)
dJP2
dwa
+ T − EP2 − wa
dEP2
dwa
< 0 (125)
Based on this, (122) and (123) it follows that
(wg − wa)
dJP2
dwa
= −
(
T − EP2 − JP2
)
+ wa
dEP2
dwa
+
d
(
Y P2g − Ŷ
)
dwa
< 0
Note in addition that
d
(
Y P2g − Ŷ
)
dwb
=
d
dwb
[
(wg − wa)J
P2 + wa
(
T − EP2
)
− Ŷ
]
= (wg − wa)
dJP2
dwb
− wa
dEP2
dwb
> 0 (126)
Based on this, (117) and (119) it follows that
(wg −wa)
dJP2
dwb
= wa
dEP2
dwb
+
d
(
Y P2g − Ŷ
)
dwb
> 0
Finally, as
d
(
Ŷ − Y P2b
)
dwg
=
d
dwg
[
Ŷ + (wa − wb)J
P2 − wa
(
T − EP2
)
]
= (wa − wb)
dJP2
dwg
+ wa
dEP2
dwg
< 0 for λ > λ̂ (127)
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Based on this, (113) and (114) it follows that for λ > λ̂
(wa − wb)
dJP2
dwg
=
d
(
Ŷ − Y P2b
)
dwg
− wa
dEP2
dwg
< 0
It follows from (96) and (97) that for Ŷ = wUT is J
P2 + EP2 = T and thus LP2 = 0.
Thus, also for wUT < Ŷ ≤ wgT is J
P2 +EP2 = T (i.e., LP2 = 0) and thus JP2 is solution of
the following problem
MaxJ : E(U(J)) =
(T−J)1−γ
1−γ + p
(wgJ−Ŷ )
1−γ
1−γ − λ(1− p)
(Ŷ−wbJ)
1−γ
1−γ
such that : Ŷwg ≤ J ≤ T







(128)
The stationary point satisfies
dE(U)
dJ
= −(T − J)−γ + p
(
wg J − Ŷ
)
−γ
wg + λ(1− p)
(
Ŷ − wb J
)
−γ
wb = 0 (129)
Note that lim
J→ Ŷ
wg
dE(U)
dJ = +∞ and limJ→T
dE(U)
dJ = −∞ imply that there exists at least one
maximum as an interior solution, i.e., JP2 ∈
(
Ŷ
wg
, T
)
and it satisfies (129). Note that JP2 is
solution of problem (128) for any value Ŷ such that Ŷ ≤ wgT . Finally, the following holds:
Y P2g = wgJ
P2 > Ŷ , Y P2b = wbJ
P2 < Ŷ and
E(U(JP2)) =
(T − JP2)1−γ
1− γ
+ p
(
wgJ
P2 − Ŷ
)1−γ
1− γ
− λ(1− p)
(
Ŷ − wbJ
P2
)1−γ
1− γ
(130)
Based on (129) and implicit function differentiation the following holds
dE(U(JP2))
dŶ
=
−p
(
wgJ
P2 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
wg + λ(1− p)
(
Ŷ − wbJ
P2
)
−1−γ
wb
− (T − JP2)
−1−γ
− p
(
wgJP2 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
w2g + λ(1− p)
(
Ŷ − wbJP2
)
−1−γ
w2b
> 0 for λ > λ(Ŷ ) (131)
dEP2
dŶ
=
d
(
T − JP2
)
dŶ
< 0 (132)
dLP2
dŶ
= 0 (133)
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d
(
Y P2g − Ŷ
)
dŶ
=
λ(1− p)
(
Ŷ −wbJ
P2
)
−1−γ
(wg − wb)wb +
(
T − JP2
)
−1−γ
− (T − JP2)
−1−γ
− p
(
wgJP2 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
w2g + λ(1− p)
(
Ŷ − wbJP2
)
−1−γ
w2b
(134)
> 0 for λ > λ(Ŷ ) (135)
d
(
Ŷ − Y P2b
)
dŶ
=
−
(
T − JP2
)
−1−γ
− p
(
wgJ
P2 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
(wg − wb)wg
− (T − JP2)
−1−γ
− p
(
wgJP2 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
w2g + λ(1− p)
(
Ŷ − wbJP2
)
−1−γ
w2b
< 0 for λ > λ1(Ŷ ) (136)
where
λ1(Ŷ ) =
(
T − JP2
)
−1−γ
+ pw2g
(
wgJ
P2 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
(1− p)w2b
(
Ŷ − wbJP2
)
−1−γ
E(U(JP2))
dŶ
=
[
−(T − JP2)−γ + p
(
wg J
P2 − Ŷ
)
−γ
wg + λ(1− p)
(
Ŷ − wb J
P2
)
−γ
wb
]
dJP2
dwg
−p
(
wgJ
P2 − Ŷ
)
−γ
− λ(1− p)
(
Ŷ − wb J
P2
)
−γ
JP2 < 0 (137)
dJP2
dT
= −
(T − JP2)−1−γ
λ(1− p)wb(Ŷ − wbJP2)−1−γ − pwg(wgJP2 − Ŷ )−1−γ − (T − JP2)−1−γ
< 0 for λ > λ2(Ŷ ) (138)
where λ2(Ŷ ) =
1
(1− p)wb
(
Ŷ −wbJ
P2
T − JP2
)1+γ

1 + pwg
(
T − JP2
wgJP2 − Ŷ
)1+γ


E(U(JP2))
dT
=
[
(
T − JP2
)−γ
+ pw2g
(
wgJ
P2 − Ŷ
)
−γ
− λ(1− p)w2b
(
Ŷ − wbJ
P2
)
−γ
]
dJP2
dT
> 0 for λ > λ3(Ŷ )
where λ3(Ŷ ) =
(
Ŷ − wbJ
P2
)γ
(1− p)w2b
[
(
T − JP2
)−γ
+ pw2g
(
wgJ
P2 − Ŷ
)
−γ
]
(139)
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dJP2
dwg
=
p
(
wgJ
P2 − Ŷ
)
−γ ( wgJP2
wgJP2−Ŷ
− 1γ
)
λ(1 − p)
(
wbJP2 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
w2b − (T − J
P2)−1−γ − p
(
wgJP2 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
w2g
≷ 0
< 0 for λ > λ4(Ŷ ) and Ŷ < (1− γ)wgJ
P2
> 0 for λ > λ4(Ŷ ) and Ŷ > (1− γ)wgJ
P2
where λ4(Ŷ ) =
(
T − JP2
)
−1−γ
+ p
(
wgJ
P2 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
w2g
(1− p)
(
wbJP2 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
w2b
(140)
E(U(JP2))
dwg
=
[
−(T − JP2)−γ + p
(
wg J
P2 − Ŷ
)
−γ
wg + λ(1− p)
(
Ŷ − wb J
P2
)
−γ
wb
]
dJP2
dwg
+p
(
wgJ
P2 − Ŷ
)
−γ
JP2 = p
(
wgJ
P2 − Ŷ
)
−γ
JP2 > 0 (141)
dJP2
dwb
=
λ(1− p)
(
Ŷ − wbJ
P2
)
−γ (
wbJ
P2
Ŷ−wbJP2
+ 1γ
)
−λ(1− p)
(
Ŷ − wbJP2
)
−1−γ
w2b + (T − J
P2)
−1−γ
+ p
(
wgJP2 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
w2g
< 0 for λ >
(
T − JP2
)
−1−γ
+ p
(
wgJ
P2 − Ŷ
)
−1−γ
w2g
(1− p)
(
Ŷ − wbJP2
)
−1−γ
w2b
E(U(JP2))
dwb
=
[
−(T − JP2)−γ + p
(
wg J
P2 − Ŷ
)
−γ
wg + λ(1− p)
(
Ŷ − wb J
P2
)
−γ
wb
]
dJP2
dwb
+λ(1− p)
(
Ŷ − wbJ
P2
)
−γ
JP2 = λ(1− p)
(
Ŷ − wbJ
P2
)
−γ
JP2 > 0 (142)
Let Yb = Ŷ . Then problem (P2) boils down to
MaxJ : (1− γ)E(U(J)) =
[
waT−Ŷ−(wa−wb)J
wa
]1−γ
+ p (wg − wb)
1−γJ1−γ
such that : 0 ≤ J ≤ min
{
Ŷ
wb
, waT−Ŷwa−wb
}



(143)
where E = T − 1wa
[
Ŷ + (wa − wb)J
]
.9 Note that this is a special case of (P1) and thus was
dealt with already.
Let Yg = Ŷ . Then problem (P2) boils down to
MaxJ : (1− γ)E(U(J)) =
[
waT−Ŷ+(wg−wa)J
wa
]1−γ
− λ(1− p) (wg − wb)
1−γJ1−γ
such that : max
{
0, Ŷ−waTwg−wa
}
≤ J ≤ Ŷwg



(144)
where E = T − 1wa
[
Ŷ − (wg − wa)J
]
. Note that constraint J ≤ Ŷwg follows from restriction
9Note that J ≤ waT−Ŷ
wa−wb
follows from E ≥ 0 and J ≤ Ŷ
wb
follows from J + E ≤ T .
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J + E ≤ T and constraint J ≥ Ŷ−waTwg−wa follows from E ≥ 0. The FOC for (144) are
dE(U(J))
dJ
=
1
w
1−γ
a
[
waT − Ŷ + (wg − wa)J
]
−γ
(wg − wa)− λ(1− p) (wg − wb)
1−γJ−γ = 0(145)
which gives
JP2
Yg=Ŷ
=
λ1/γk2
wg − wa
·
Ŷ − waT
λ1/γk2 − wa
EP2
Yg=Ŷ
=
Ŷ −waT
λ1/γk2 − wa
E
(
U
(
JP2
Yg=Ŷ
))
= −
(
λ1/γk2 − wa
)γ
(
Ŷ − waT
)1−γ
wa(1− γ)
(146)
which is feasible for loss averse worker if Ŷ ≥ waT and λ >
(
wa
k2
)γ
. Comparing (146) to (100)
gives
E
(
U
(
JP2
Yg=Ŷ
))
< E
(
U
(
JP2, EP2
))
when Ŷ > waT while these two values of the utility function coincide (and equal to zero)
when Ŷ = waT . Note that for λ >
(
wa
k2
)γ
is d
2
E(U(J))
dJ2
∣
∣
∣
J=JP2
Yg=Ŷ
< 0 and thus is the local
maxima for (144). Note that for Ŷ ≥ waT is
E
(
U
(
J =
Ŷ − waT
wg − wa
))
= −λkγ2
(Ŷ − waT )
1−γ
wa(1− γ)
≤ −
(
λ1/γk2 − wa
)γ
(
Ŷ − waT
)1−γ
wa(1− γ)
= E
(
U
(
JP2
Yg=Ŷ
))
and as dE(U(J))dJ
∣
∣
∣
J= Ŷ
wg
< 0, for λ >
[
(wg−wa)Ŷ
(wgT−Ŷ )k2
]γ
, and JP2
Yg=Ŷ
is the only local maxima for
(144) and
E
(
U
(
JP2
Yg=Ŷ
))
> E
(
U
(
J =
Ŷ
wg
))
For Ŷ < waT problem (144) has no stationary solution. Note that in this case the utility
function in (144) is decreasing for λ >
(
wa
k2
)γ
as
(
wa − λ
1/γk2
)
J ≤
λ1/γk2
wg − wa
(
waT − Ŷ
)
and thus its maximum is reached at J = 0. Note that point
(
J = 0, E = T − Ŷwa
)
is feasible
for (P1) and thus the value of the utility function of (P1) at this point is exceeded by the
maximum of (P1).
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Let E = 0. Then problem (P2) boils down to
MaxJ : (1− γ)E(U(J)) = p
[
(wg − wa)J + waT − Ŷ
]1−γ
−λ(1− p)
[
(wa − wb)J + Ŷ −waT
]1−γ
such that : max
{
waT − Ŷ
wa − wb
,
Ŷ − waT
wg − wa
}
≤ J ≤ T (147)
The FOC for (147) are
dE(U(J))
dJ
= p
[
(wg − wa)J +waT − Ŷ
]
−γ
(wg − wa)− λ(1− p)
[
(wa − wb)J + Ŷ − waT
]
−γ
(wa − wb) = 0
which gives
JP2E=0 =
(λK)1/γ + 1
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
·
Ŷ − waT
wa −wb
EP2E=0 = 0
E
(
U
(
JP2E=0
))
= −kγ
[
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
]γ
(
Ŷ − waT
)1−γ
wa(1− γ)
(148)
if Ŷ ≥ waT and λ >
1
Kγ
. Based on (100) and (148) it follows that for Ŷ ≥ waT is
E
(
U
(
JP2, EP2
))
> E
(
U
(
JP2E=0, E = 0
))
Note that based on (148), the following holds for Ŷ ≥ waT
E
(
U
(
JP2E=0, E = 0
))
> E
(
U
(
J =
Ŷ − waT
wg − wa
, E = 0
))
= −kγλKγ
(
Ŷ − waT
)1−γ
wa(1− γ)
In addition, note that for λ > 1K
(
Ŷ−wbT
wgT−Ŷ
)γ
is dE(U(J))dJ
∣
∣
J=T
< 0 and thus utility function of
(148) does not exceed E
(
U
(
JP2, EP2
))
when Ŷ ≥ waT .
Let wbT ≤ Ŷ < waT . Note that from the feasibility constraints as given in (147) Ŷ must
exceed wbT and thus for Ŷ < wbT (and also for Ŷ < wLT as wL < wb) is the set of feasible
solutions of (147) empty. Then JP2E=0 is not feasible for (147), i.e., (147) has no stationary
solution. Note in addition that for λ > 1Kγ is the utility function of (147) decreasing and thus
we compare the utility function of (147) at J = waT−Ŷwa−wb to the utility function of (P1) in its
maximum, i.e., to (56). Based on (56) we have
E
(
U
(
J =
waT − Ŷ
wa −wb
, E = 0
))
= kγ
(waT − Ŷ )
1−γ
wa(1− γ)
< E
(
U
(
JP1, EP1
))
(149)
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and thus utility function of (148) does not exceed E
(
U
(
JP1, EP1
))
when wLT ≤ Ŷ < waT .
Let J = 0. Based on (P2), there is the only feasible solution for J = 0, which is
(
J = 0, E = T − Ŷwa
)
which is feasible only when Ŷ ≤ waT and for which Yg = Yb = Ŷ and
thus this point is feasible also for (P1) and reaches the same value of the utility function.
This case was thus tackled in (P1).
Summary for (P2):
(S1-P2) For waT < Ŷ < wUT and λ > max
{
λP2,
[
(wg−wa)Ŷ
(wgT−Ŷ )k2
]γ}
there exists an interior solution
of (P2), namely
(
JP2, EP2
)
, given by (94) and (93). Note that 0 < LP2 = T − JP2 −
EP2 < T .
(S2-P2) For Ŷ ≥ wUT there exists a solution of (P2) such that J
P2 satisfies (129) and EP2 =
T − JP2. Note that LP2 = 0.
(S3-P2) For wbT ≤ Ŷ ≤ waT and λ > max
{
1
Kγ
,
(
wa
k2
)γ}
is maximu of (P2), see cases Yg = Ŷ ,
E = 0 and J = 0, exceeded by maximum of (P1) as given by (56).
(S4-P2) For Ŷ = waT and λ > max
{
1
Kγ
,
(
wa
k2
)γ}
the solution of (P2) is
(
JP2 = 0, EP2 = 0
)
and also its utility function is zero.
(S5-P2) For Ŷ < wbT and λ >
(
wa
k2
)γ
is maximum of (P2), see cases Yg = Ŷ and J = 0,
exceeded by maximum of (P1).
(S6-P2) For Ŷ = wgT the solution of (P2) is
(
JP2 = T,EP2 = 0
)
. In adddition, LP2 = 0,
Y P2g = Ŷ , Ŷ − Y
P2
b = (wg − wb)T and E(U(J
P2, EP2)) = −λ(1− p)
(wg−wb)
1−γ
1−γ T
1−γ .
Problem (P3):
Max(J,E) : E(U(J,E)) =
E1−γ
1−γ − λp
[Ŷ−(wg−wa)J−wa(T−E)]
1−γ
1−γ − λ(1− p)
[Ŷ+(wa−wb)J−wa(T−E)]
1−γ
1−γ
such that : J ≥ Ŷ−wa(T−E)wg−wa
J + E ≤ T
J, E ≥ 0

















(P3)
The first order conditions are
dE(U)
dJ = λp
[
Ŷ − (wg − wa)J − wa(T − E)
]
−γ
(wg − wa)
−λ(1− p)
[
Ŷ + (wa − wb)J − wa(T − E)
]
−γ
(wa − wb) = 0
dE(U)
dE = E
−γ − λp
[
Ŷ − (wg − wa)J −wa(T − E)
]
−γ
wa
−λ(1− p)
[
Ŷ + (wa − wb)J − wa(T − E)
]
−γ
wa = 0





















(150)
40
From the feasibility condition of problem (P3) it follows that Ŷ ≥ wa(T − E) which implies
(after some derivations) that dE(U)dJ > 0 (i.e., E(U(J,E)) is increasing function in J for any
feasible E) and thus there is no stationary point for (P3). From the set of feasible solutions
of (P3) it follows that the maximum of (P3) will be reached at
J(E) =
Ŷ − wa(T − E)
wg − wa
(151)
and thus Y P3g = Ŷ . By plugging (151) into the objective function of (P3) we obtain
MaxE : (1− γ)E(U(E)) = E
1−γ − λ(1− p)
(
wg−wb
wg−wa
)1−γ [
Ŷ − wa(T − E)
]1−γ
such that : max
{
0, T − Ŷwa
}
≤ E ≤ T − Ŷwg









(P3-interior)
which implies that the neccessary condition for (P3-interior) to be feasible is Ŷ ≤ wgT .
Note that condition E ≤ T − Ŷwg , in the set of feasible solution of (P3-interior), follows from
J(E) + E ≤ T , and condition E ≥ T − Ŷwa follows from J(E) ≥ 0, see (151). The FOC for
(P3-interior) are
dE(U)
dE
= E−γ − λ(1− p)
(
wg − wb
wg − wa
)1−γ
wa
[
Ŷ − wa(T − E)
]
−γ
= 0 (152)
which implies that
EP3 =
Ŷ − waT
λ1/γk2 − wa
(153)
After plugging (153) into (151) we obtain
JP3 =
λ1/γk2
λ1/γk2 − wa
Ŷ − waT
wg − wa
=
λ1/γk2
wg − wa
EP3 (154)
(153) implies that EP3 ≥ 0 if Ŷ ≥ waT and λ >
(
wa
k2
)γ
for a loss averse worker and
EP3 ≤ T − Ŷwg if Ŷ ≤ w
P3
U T , where w
P3
U ≡
wg
1+
wg−wa
λ1/γk2
≤ wg.
10
FOC (152) imply that
1
γ
d2E(U)
dE2
= −E−1−γ + λwak
γ
2
[
Ŷ − wa(T − E)
]
−1−γ
(155)
10Note that for λ >
(
wa
k2
)γ
is wa < w
P3
U .
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and thus, after some derivations we obtain
(
EP3
)1+γ
[
Ŷ − wa
(
T − EP3
)
]1+γ 1
γ
d2E(U)
dE2
= λkγ2
(
EP3
)1+γ
(
wa − λ
1/γk2
)
< 0 (156)
for λ >
(
wa
k2
)γ
. This implies that EP3 is the point of local maxima of problem (P3-interior).
Note in addition that
E(U(JP3, EP3)) = −
(
λ1/γk2 − wa
)γ (Ŷ − waT )
1−γ
wa(1− γ)
(157)
Finally, (152) implies that limE→0
dE(U)
dE = +∞, and
dE(U)
dE
∣
∣
∣
E=T− Ŷ
wg
= wγg
[
1
(wgT−Ŷ )
γ − λ
(
k2
(wg−wa)Ŷ
)γ
]
< 0 for λ >
[
(wg−wa)Ŷ
(wgT−Ŷ )k2
]γ
. This and the
fact that EP3, which is such that 0 ≤ EP3 ≤ T − Ŷwg , is the (only) point of local maxima
for (P3-interior) implies that for waT ≤ Ŷ ≤ w
P3
U T and λ > max
{(
wa
k2
)γ
,
[
(wg−wa)Ŷ
(wgT−Ŷ )k2
]γ}
,
utility function of (P3-interior) obtaines its maximum at EP3 and utility function of (P3)
obtaines its maximum at
(
JP3, EP3
)
.
Note that for Ŷ = waT problem (P3-interior) boils down to
MaxE : (1− γ)E(U(E)) = E
1−γ
[
1− λ
(
k2
wa
)γ]
such that : 0 ≤ E ≤
(
1− wawg
)
T







and its utility function is decreasing for λ >
(
wa
k2
)γ
and thus its maximum is reached at
EP3 = 0 and based on (151) also JP3 = 0.
It can be easily shown that for Ŷ < waT and λ >
(
wa
k2
)γ
is the utility function of (P3-
interior) decreasing in E, i.e., dE(U)dE < 0, see (152). Thus, the maximum of (P3-interior) is
reached at
EP3 = T −
Ŷ
wa
(158)
and thus, based on (151)
JP3 = 0 (159)
and thus LP3 = Ŷwa and J
P3 +EP3 = T . This gives
E(U(JP3, EP3)) =
(
T − Ŷwa
)1−γ
1− γ
(160)
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If wP3U T < Ŷ ≤ wgT , then the maximum of (P3) is reached at
EP3 = T −
Ŷ
wg
(161)
and thus, based on (151)
JP3 =
Ŷ
wg
(162)
which gives
(1− γ)E(U(JP3, EP3)) =
(
T −
Ŷ
wg
)1−γ
− λ(1− p)
(
1−
wb
wg
)1−γ
Ŷ 1−γ (163)
In addition, LP3 = 0, Y P3g = Ŷ , Y
P3
b =
wb
wg
Ŷ .
Note finally that for max
{
wU , w
P3
U
}
T ≤ Ŷ ≤ wgT the maximum of utility function of
(P3), see (163), is exceeded by the the maximum of utility function of (P2) as E(U(J = Ŷwg )),
see (128), coincides with the maximum utility function of (P3) as given by (163).
Summary for (P3):
(S1-P3) For waT ≤ Ŷ ≤ w
P3
U T and λ > max
{(
wa
k2
)γ
,
[
(wg−wa)Ŷ
(wgT−Ŷ )k2
]γ}
there exists a solution
of (P3), namely
(
JP3, EP3
)
, given by (154) and (153) such that Y P3g = Ŷ . Note that
0 < LP3 = T − JP3 − EP3 < T .
In addition, (100) and (157) imply that E(U(JP2, EP2)) > E(U(JP3, EP3)).
(S2-P3) For Ŷ < waT and λ >
(
wa
k2
)γ
there exists a solution of (P3), namely
(
JP3, EP3
)
, given
by (159) and (158) such that Y P3g = Y
P3
b = Ŷ . Note that 0 < L
P3 = Ŷwa < T and thus
EP3 + LP3 = T .
In addition, as
(
JP3, EP3
)
is feasible for (P1) then E(U(JP1, EP1)) > E(U(JP3, EP3))
for Ŷ < waT .
(S3-P3) For wP3U T < Ŷ ≤ wgT there exists a solution of (P3), namely
(
JP3, EP3
)
, given by
(162) and (161) such that Y P3g = Ŷ , J
P3 + EP3 = T and thus LP3 = 0.
In addition, for max
{
wU , w
P3
U
}
T ≤ Ŷ ≤ wgT is E(U(J
P2, EP2)) > E(U(JP3, EP3)).
(S4-P3) For Ŷ = waT and λ >
(
wa
k2
)γ
the solution of (P3) is
(
JP3 = 0, EP3 = 0
)
and also its
utility function is zero.
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